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ABSTRACT
This article considers the European Union’s (EU) role in the media and commu-
nications field concerning analogue switch-off/digital switchover. It focuses on the 
EU Competition Directorate’s approach concerning the application of the State Aid 
mechanism with regard to those Member States who have used public subsidies for 
digital switchover. Therefore, this analysis considers how the Directorate has sought 
to balance its market-driven set of rules with the need to be adaptable to the Member 
States’ specific requirements. In turn, this account will discuss how the demand to 
achieve the 2012 completion deadline, alongside the requirement to release analogue 
spectrum to realize a digital dividend, impacted upon the EU’s principles of competi-
tion. Finally, this analysis will reflect on how the employment of State Aid in rela-
tion to digital switchover relates to a wider debate concerning the EU’s neo-liberal 
agendas against Member States’ interests to promote their national cultures.
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INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss the European Commission’s (EC) Competition Policy 
procedures in relation to matters of analogue switch-off/digital switchover. It 
focuses on the European Union’s (EU) Competition Directorate’s approach 
concerning the application of the State Aid mechanism with regard to those 
Member States who have used public subsidies for digital switchover. In this 
respect, the EC has deployed its competition rules to pursue a normative view 
founded upon the liberalization of services and the enhancement of consumer 
needs to ensure economic opportunities. However, it was further required to 
deliver a framework for social accountability to allow for an equitable deliv-
ery of services across a range of different platforms. Therefore, this analysis 
considers not only how the Directorate’s approach was governed by a market-
driven set of rules, but discusses whether it has been adaptable enough to 
encompass the specific requirements of Member States.
For national television markets, the introduction of digital services has 
been perceived as a means to facilitate a range of technological, economic 
and social reforms. Especially, as digitalization provides a different way for the 
sending, receiving and decoding of signals, digital television (DTV) operations 
can carry many more channels than their analogue predecessors. Through the 
compression of data in which eight digital channels will use the amount of 
spectrum previously taken up by one analogue station, consumers may bene-
fit in enjoying a wider degree of choice; improved picture quality and better 
sound; a greater amount of flexibility through portable and mobile reception, 
on-demand and enhanced information services. In tandem, business oppor-
tunities are exponentially increased to allow for new market suppliers, a rise in 
competition, first mover advantage, alternative forms of delivery and conver-
gence. In this respect, digitalization has become a major pillar in the EU’s 
i2010 initiative and within the Lisbon agenda adopted in 2000. 
Moreover, the freeing up of the analogue transmission spectrum means 
that a ‘digital dividend’ may be affected for commercial gain. In particu-
lar, the switching off of analogue broadcasts will leave a surplus of radio 
frequencies to be divided into three sub-bands on the available ultra-high 
frequency (UHF) band 470–862 MHz for other applications. These include 
opportunities for mobile and high-definition television alongside the release 
of 800 MHz bandwidths for transnational mobile telephony including 3G, 
4G and WiMAX. Concurrently, the employment of digitally based services 
has been seen to encourage the free flow of information and allow for a 
pluralistic media. In terms of freedom of the expression, the new technol-
ogy enables audiences to seek and receive more information via the broad-
cast media. 
Consequently, the EU has sought to promote digital switchover for 
economic gain, social opportunities and consumer/citizen benefits. It has 
attempted to formulate a harmonization of digital switchover throughout the 
range of EU Member States while maintaining the principles of subsidiarity 
and derogation. Thus, the Commission recognized the importance of digital 
switchover in its 2005 Action Plan eEurope and in three related communica-
tions. In particular, the Commission committed itself to the goal of analogue 
switch-off/digital switchover by 2012. This was especially problematic, as at 
the beginning of the switchover process in 2003, 43 per cent of all European 
households were still only in receipt of analogue-based terrestrial services 
(Matteucci 2008: 3).
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Moreover, the EU was confronted by the problem that the exponential 
take-up by Member States of digital terrestrial television (DTT), digital satel-
lite television (DST) and digital cable television (DCT) services has been 
differentiated due to specific national governmental frameworks, regulatory 
structures and market demand (Iosifidis 2011b: 162). Especially, despite the 
mandatory requirement of technological neutrality, it became apparent that 
the market leading DTT platform’s penetration on an EU-wide level was 
inconsistent and problematic. Such variability within take-up has led to ques-
tions of potential market failure and the need to affect public subsidies to 
ensure complete take-up by 2012. 
Therefore, Member State governments, regulators and audio-visual actors 
have sought financial support through public subsidies to facilitate analogue 
switch-off/digital switchover. For the EU Competition Directorate, this usage 
of public subsidies triggered the employment of the State Aid mechanism 
to determine whether such an employment of funds was competitive or 
had unfairly distorted the market between public and commercial television 
suppliers. Further, there was an underlying concern that such an employment 
of state monies would lead to a form of ‘mission creep’ in which the values of 
the market might be absorbed into a wider array of public service provisions 
(Donders and Pauwels 2008: 295). These concerns have led to several State 
Aid cases concerning digital switchover being considered by the Directorate.
This article discusses how the provision of Competition Policy with regard 
to the State Aid Action Plan for switchover has been defined by three signifi-
cant factors. First, State Aid should be targeted to stem the potential market 
failures concerning the pace of take-up and cohesion due to universal serv-
ice obligations (USO) but only in a proportionate manner so as to remain 
competitive. Second, any intervention must respect the principles of techno-
logical neutrality and interoperability between the different digital platforms 
as confirmed by the Regulatory Framework. Third, the regulation governing 
the access to public funds should facilitate the EU’s central goal of sustainable 
digitalization for the benefit of media plurality and consumer choice.
Second, it will focus on how these ideological, regulatory and policy frame-
works have been utilized to define State Aid decisions in relation to digital 
switchover cases in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. In each of these 
State Aid cases there has been an interface between the liberalizing principles 
of the Directorate and the economic, political and cultural/historical trajecto-
ries of the Member States’ broadcasting ecology. For instance, in Germany 
switchover related to greater concerns about the coordination of public and 
commercial interests to ensure social cohesion, whereas the Italian case has 
been determined by the economic and political interests of Silvio Berlusconi’s 
Mediaset as against Rupert Murdoch’s Sky Italia. Within the United Kingdom, 
such measures contributed to a debate about the usage and proportion of 
subsidies to be drawn from the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) 
licence fee (known as top-slicing).
Finally, in relation to the changing nature of and complexities associ-
ated with digitization, this analysis will conclude with a discussion of how 
the employment of State Aid in relation to digital switchover refers to wider 
debates concerning the EU’s integrationist, neo-liberal agenda as against 
Member States’ rights of derogation. Thus, it will consider matters concern-
ing the financial support for switchover in new Member States such as 
Slovakia, who have entered the EU due to the processes of Enlargement. In 
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tandem, the current economic crisis within the EU has confirmed fears that 
the respective commercial and democratic gains of switchover could be fatally 
compromised. 
In turn, it considers how the regulatory environment has been shaped by 
the EU’s concern to liberalize services for market opportunities, while national 
governments have sought to use public subsidies for digitization to maintain 
social cohesion and consumer protection. And it will discuss whether these 
fissures have facilitated tensions between the EU’s ‘macro’ liberalizing tenden-
cies to ensure an internal market and ‘micro’ interests within Member States, 
concerning their sovereignty over the regulation of communications industries 
(Iosifidis 2011a, 2011b: 162).
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE EU STATE AID ACTION PLAN AND DIGITAL 
SWITCHOVER: MARKET FAILURE, COMPETITIVE PRACTICES AND 
THE FACILITATION OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
The Commission contends that a State Aid is an appropriate measure if it 
may stem a market failure. To determine the legitimacy of a State Aid the 
EU employs a well-established legal framework that is embedded in the EC 
Treaty to provide it with a considerable degree of authority for action. More 
recently, the Commission has further contended that if a societal gain cannot 
be shown to have been maximized, even in cases where market efficiency 
has been demonstrated, there are grounds for the use of public subsidies to 
enhance specific social outcomes (European Commission 2009). However:
Very clearly, [the EU’s] approach [to State Aid] is underscored by strong 
normative assumptions of the superiority of the market. […] Overall, 
the EU’s approach is underpinned by two key ideas – maintaining the 
primacy of market based competition, where State Aid is viewed as 
distortive, though necessary, and ensuring appropriate returns (value) 
for any state resources which are invested. 
(Simpson 2011: 8)
Therefore, at a general level, it is the EU’s belief that public assistance should 
not replace the market provision of digital services. Consequently, a key factor 
in whether public subsidies should be employed concerning digital switcho-
ver has been determined by the requirement to accelerate take-up by 2012. 
Although it remains debatable about whether the 2012 deadline for switcho-
ver is legitimate as ‘it may lead … to an ill-timed, insufficiently planned and 
unduly rapid introduction of … DTT’ (Iosifidis 2011b: 162), it has been the 
Commission’s belief that if left entirely to the market there is the risk that 
switchover will be slowed down. Such a slowdown could be potentially fatal 
for the expansion of the digital economy and may undermine public access to 
the full delivery of services (Nordlander and Melin 2006: 257). 
Moreover, switchover may be deemed to have ‘positive externalities’ that 
refer not only to a more efficient usage of the frequency spectrum, but to 
the concern that the extension of channels has a social benefit for consumer 
demands and citizens rights. Yet, such a ‘common good’ function could often 
exceed the private interests of the incumbent broadcasters. For instance, a 
commercial broadcaster who does not anticipate a significant increase in audi-
ence share and a rise in advertising revenues might be reluctant to partici-
pate in switchover. Consequently, the acceleration of the analogue switch-off 
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process to reap the benefits of the freed-up spectrum is a valid justification for 
public intervention and possible exemption from an unfettered marketplace. 
In addition, the 2005 State Aid Action Plan comments that Member States 
may employ State Aid to overcome specific market failures in the transference 
from analogue to digital services to ensure social cohesion. As María Trinidad 
García Leiva and Michael Starks comment, two distinct patterns of analogue 
switch-off/digital switchover have occurred (2009: 790). First, in countries 
with extensive cable and satellite reception (Germany, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland), analogue switch-off has been theoretically sustain-
able as only a small section of the population has been dependent on terres-
trial reception. However, in a second model of transference, in states such as 
the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Italy, the majority of households have 
received terrestrial-based forms of analogue transmissions. For example, in 
Italy nineteen million out of its 22 million households (84.2 per cent) have been 
serviced by terrestrial forms of distribution (Santomato and Salso 2006: 96). 
Moreover, there have been significant variations in DTV take-up among 
northern, southern and eastern European countries. In 2010, DTV house-
hold adoption in Finland, Norway and Sweden stood well above 70% with 
the United Kingdom having the highest rate of penetration standing at 92%. 
Conversely, in Mediterranean states such as Italy, Spain and Greece take-up 
levels were well below 50% and in these Member States there was limited 
awareness of the process of analogue switch-off/digital switchover (Iosifidis 
2011b: 162). This means that the process of transfer is problematized by the 
variation in different states of digital penetration and the greater amount of 
time that is required for switchover. Further, there is a significant danger that 
only a limited section of the population will benefit from the advantages of 
DTV (García Leiva and Starks 2009: 790–91). These problems are made more 
acute due to the expenses incurred by the parallel forms of ‘simulcasting’ 
between analogue and digital transmissions that are necessitated to smooth 
the course of switchover. 
Across Member States, terrestrial networks have been employed to fulfil 
USOs. This means that a high percentage of the population should be covered 
by digital transmissions before any government can contemplate analogue 
switch-off. Therefore, the Commission acknowledges that a cohesive switcho-
ver can be undermined by several types of market failure concerning the coor-
dination of technological reforms; the danger that incumbent broadcasters 
will gain a competitive advantage by delaying switchover and that problems 
associated with audience uncertainty will undermine USOs.
Conversely, the Competition Directorate still requires that the Member 
States abide by State Aid instruments to address switchover to stem any distor-
tion of competition and to ensure that the level of subsidy remains limited to 
an absolute minimum. Therefore, of greater concern for the Directorate than 
market failure has been how the EU State Aid Action Plan might be employed 
to support sustainable growth and competitiveness. Thus, the EC requires 
that the given State Aid scheme for the digital switchover must be proportion-
ate to the public service obligations. It is only when these conditions are met 
that State Aid schemes can be considered for approval under Article 87(3) (c) 
of the EU Treaty (Wheeler 2010: 57). 
The Commission contends that this approach provides a fairer assessment 
of the investigated measures as only well-targeted forms of aid may be under-
stood to be in-line with the overall objective of promoting competitiveness and 
technological development across Europe (Schoser and Santamato 2006: 23). 
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To this end, the Directorate has examined what effect market failures may have 
on the switchover process by primarily assessing whether these perceived fail-
ures prevent the market from achieving full economic efficiency. 
Similarly, the EC contends that there should be technological neutrality 
insofar that there should be competition between platform providers and that 
no one platform – terrestrial, cable or satellite – may be favoured by a national 
authority. Therefore, in principle, each network is required to compete on its 
own strengths and Member States cannot be discriminatory. While public 
support for one particular option cannot be excluded it should be justified 
by well-defined general interests and be implemented in a proportionate 
manner. However, due to market demand, DTT has become the most diffused 
platform across the EU. Therefore, the Commission has been concerned that 
with the different levels of DTT penetration across national markets, there 
has been a further pressure to employ public subsidies for DTT switchover to 
ensure USOs. 
Finally, public subsidies may be used to sustain the EU’s central goal of effi-
cient digitalization for the benefit of media plurality and consumer choice. This 
means that not all measures constitute State Aid. For example, in one ruling, 
the Commission decided that the UK regulator OfCom’s decision to replace 
existing analogue licences with digital replacement licences (DRLs) for terres-
trial broadcasters including Independent Television (ITV), Channel 4 (C4), 
Channel 5 and Public Teletext was appropriate as the DRL’s contained obliga-
tions related to the digital switchover (European Commission 2006). In view 
of these obligations and of the diminished ‘scarcity’ value of the broadcasting 
licences, the regulator reduced the costs associated with broadcasting licence 
fees – the so-called ‘additional payments’.
However, in spite of such exemptions, the EC has been concerned with 
how ‘to seize this potential in our digital economy’, through facilitating the 
opportunities for competitive market supply claiming that: 
Europe will need to create the right framework for ensuring effective 
competition and sound regulatory conditions in a well-functioning single 
market as well as incentives for innovation. In view of the commitment 
to the social market economy, we also need to make sure that, in the 
end, consumers benefit from the digital economy. 
(Reding 2009: 2)
STATE AID AND DIGITAL SWITCHOVER CASES
It has been with these values in mind that the Competition Directorate has 
considered a range of cases within Member States concerning the utilization 
of public subsidies to extend the possibilities of analogue switch-off/digital 
switchover. The assessment of a State Aid case occurs as a two-stage process. 
First, the Commission has to investigate whether a measure can be considered 
as being a form of State Aid. Second, if the measure is defined as a State Aid, 
the Commission investigates if any exception or derogation may be deemed 
as being appropriate. A State Aid must receive the Commission’s approval 
prior to implementation; otherwise the recipient could be liable for the repay-
ment of the subsidy. 
In applying these measures, the EC has noted that in many European coun-
tries, governments have reserved monies to support consumers, broadcasters 
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and network operators to affect digital switchover. However, there have been 
significant controversies concerning the character of these subsidies. This has 
led to the Directorate considering whether these forms of State Aid may be 
deemed as being illegitimate due to their unfair distortion of the competi-
tive marketplace. Yet, the EC’s response has been further conditioned by the 
specific nature of the national broadcasting market, political interests, matters 
of technological neutrality and interoperability, questions of market failure, 
and concerns about whether incumbent players have benefited at the expense 
of their competitive rivals. 
GERMANY: THE BERLIN-BRANDENBURG CASE – SOCIAL 
COHESION VERSUS COMPETITION
The Commission has had to rule over several German State Aid measures 
regarding digital switchover. The most important of these cases occurred 
in 2005, when the EC had to decide whether the regional funding awarded by 
the Media Council of the Media Authority for Berlin-Brandenburg (MABB) for 
promoting switchover to the European standard terrestrial digital video broad-
casting (DVB-T) network out of licence fees was commensurate with State Aid 
rulings. The MABB investigation indicated how the two of the German Lander 
had employed public subsidies as a means to lubricate a cohesive transfer for 
analogue switch-off/digital switchover (García Leiva and Starks 2009: 791).
On 13 February 2002, to affect the smooth digitization of broadcast-
ing, MABB had concluded a ‘Switchover Agreement’ with the public service 
broadcasters (PSB) including Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen 
Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ARD) and the Zweites 
Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF), and commercial players such as Radio Television 
Luxemburg (RTL) and ProSiebenSat.1, which contained schedules for switchover 
and the allocation of programme channels. In this respect, MABB had achieved 
an effective coordination for switchover by affecting binding agreements from 
all parties and due to a comprehensive public communications campaign, 
which was deemed as being socially acceptable (Iosifidis 2006: 261). The Berlin-
Brandenburg case was praised as a model for switchover as the region had the 
appropriate technical and commercial infrastructure to allow for a relatively short 
phase of simulcasting and had completed the switchover by 2003. 
Therefore, MABB contended that these grants had been designed to 
offset market failures and had ensured media diversity by safeguarding 
infrastructure competition for digital modes of transmission. In particular, it 
argued that subsidies would ensure an appropriate coordination of players 
to ensure the removal of any barriers that could undermine the expedition 
of a speedy process for switchover. Further, MABB claimed the 4 million 
granted to the broadcasting groups was proportionate as it reflected how the 
transmission costs of a multiplex (consisting of several bundled program-
ming channels) were 50 per cent more expensive than those accrued through 
broadcasting programmes on an analogue service. And the German Federal 
Government argued that as the financial assistance had not been selective 
it did not distort competition as any broadcaster or network operator could 
have benefited from the funding. 
Yet, following complaints from cable operators, the Competition 
Directorate decided MABB had unfairly facilitated the use of public subsi-
dies for the advantages of the incumbent commercial broadcasters RTL and 
ProSiebenSat.1. Especially, in exchange for undertakings with these groups 
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to transmit via DTT for five years, it contended MABB had inequitably allo-
cated entire multiplexes to each organization, regardless of audience figures. 
In particular, the EC pointed out that RTL enjoyed an annual level of grant 
of 265,000 per annum at a rate of 66,250 per programme channel, while 
ProSiebenSat.1 received a subsidy of 330,000 a year working out at 82,500 
for each channel. Moreover, the financial assistance granted to the commer-
cial broadcasters indirectly benefited the network operator T-Systems as it 
would enjoy guaranteed income from the two major German broadcasting 
groups for a minimum of five years. In turn, the Commission commented that 
such financial assistance also enabled T-Systems to charge higher transmis-
sion prices. 
Therefore, for the EU, MABB’s use of public funds was felt to be anti-
competitive as it had skewed the German broadcasting system by favouring 
incumbent commercial players and had undermined an open and transparent 
tendering process. Moreover, the EU noted that while MABB’s use of state 
intervention achieved beneficial forms of cohesion; in this case such a use 
of State Aid breached the principles of technological neutrality as it forced 
consumers to use T-Systems infrastructure to access the digital platform. 
Further, in terms of MABB arguments concerning the need for coordination to 
stem market failures, the Directorate concluded:
State Aid to reduce the burden of transmission costs is not the appropri-
ate instrument to address the problem of coordination between market 
players. Limiting the duration of the simulcast phase and achieving 
a simultaneous switchover may instead be attained by, for example, 
setting a common expiry date for all analogue licences. 
(Nordlander and Melin 2006: 260)
The MABB decision proved to be a test-case and had implications for the 
application of State Aid concerning digital switchover in other Member States. 
Principally, the EC decided that the specific indications of acceptable forms of 
public subsidy included: 
Funding for the roll-out of a transmission network in areas where other-• 
wise there would be insufficient television coverage
Financial compensation to PSBs for the cost of broadcasting via all trans-• 
mission platforms in order to reach the entire population, provided this 
forms part of the public service mandate
Subsidies to consumers for the purchase of digital decoders as long as they • 
are technologically neutral, especially if they encourage the use of open 
standards for interactivity
Financial compensation to broadcasters, which are required to discon-• 
tinue analogue transmission before the expiry of their licences, provided 
this takes account of granted digital transmission capacity (European 
Commission 2005). 
Accordingly, the EU would employ this form of reasoning when it considered 
whether there had been an imposition of specific platforms of distribution 
in other switchover cases in other German regions including North Rhine-
Westphalia and Bavaria, along with Sweden and Austria and concluded that 
they had breached State Aid rules. Subsequently, in 2010, the Directorate 
found that Spanish plans for the subsidizing of DTT switchover and the 
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implementation of DTV services in the Castille La Mancha region similarly 
violated the principles of interoperability between platforms (for further details 
see Matteucci 2008 and European Commission 2010b).
ITALY: COMPETITION AS A FORM OF CORPORATE 
WAR – SKY ITALIA VERSUS MEDIASET
The precedent of MABB would be an important determinant for other State 
Aid cases, especially with regard to the digitization of the Italian broad-
casting system. In Italy, the television market was dominated by two major 
incumbents; Radiotelevisone Italiana (RAI), the public broadcaster, and the 
commercial media monopoly Mediaset, owned by the broadcasting mogul 
and on-off Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. As both suppliers oper-
ated through terrestrial networks, digital switchover was not welcomed by 
either the Italian media or the political elites. Specifically, the inclusion of a 
wider spectrum of airwaves has meant that more channels could be broad-
casted thereby leading to the potential growth of new or alternative competi-
tors. Consequently, the European rules for switchover were implemented at a 
painfully slow rate and the abolition of the analogue signal was postponed on 
several occasions. 
However, this process was radically altered when Rupert Murdoch’s News 
Corporation established a competitive satellite broadcaster monopoly from 
its acquisition of the existing Telepiu stations (owned by Vivendi), which was 
renamed as Sky Italia in 2002. From thence on, the Italian government (led by 
Berlusconi on a second occasion from 2001to 2006) argued that as the terres-
trial delivery of broadcasting signals was the major means of receiving televi-
sion in Italy, a subsidized programme for DTT switchover was necessary. It 
claimed that such a use of State Aid would ensure that the commercial appli-
cations of digitization could be maximized for the public’s social benefit. 
Therefore, from 2004 to 2005, Berlusconi’s government distributed over 
200 million in grants to enable consumers to purchase or rent interac-
tive digital decoders capable of receiving only DTT and DCT transmissions 
(European Commission 2007: 1). In effect, these subsidies awarded each buyer 
of digital terrestrial decoders with a sum of 150 per person in 2004 and 70 
in 2005. In 2006, Italy provided notification of a further measure that subsi-
dized the purchase by Sardinian and Valle d’Aosta DTT consumers of interac-
tive decoders that included an open application programming interface (API) 
(Santomato and Salso 2006: 98). 
Thus, at a formal level, Italy defended the scheme by citing DTT’s 
benefits including an improved use of frequencies to promote pluralism, 
economic development, information technologies and e-society services. 
However, these measures reflected the ongoing war that was occurring 
between the Berlusconi and Murdoch empires. They were part of a process 
through which the Italian government, in an outrageous conflict of interests, 
sought to rid Mediaset of its major DST pay-TV competitor. This approach 
protected Mediaset’s revenues as 88 per cent of its digital services were 
funded by subscription monies by undermining the economic opportuni-
ties for Sky Italia. Moreover, in applying these public subsidies, Berlusconi’s 
government failed to notify the Commission, and by only supporting the 
purchase of terrestrial decoders undermined the EU principles of technologi-
cal neutrality. Such a lack of interoperability was evidenced in the exclusion 
of Sky Italia’s customers (who used alternative satellite DVB-S decoders) 
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from receiving financial support in buying the kit required to receive digital 
satellite services. 
It was within this economic, political and regulatory context that Sky 
Italia’s lawyers filed a complaint to the Competition Directorate contending 
that the Italian state’s financial contributions unfairly distorted the Italian 
pay-TV market. In turn, the Commission opened a formal State Aid inves-
tigation into the 2004–2005 subsidies, while simultaneously providing an 
analysis of the 2006 measures, on which it had also received complaints 
from satellite television operators. In 2007, after consulting with the market 
operators, the Commission concluded that both the 2004–2005 and the 2006 
round of subsidies provided an indirect advantage to the incumbent terres-
trial television broadcasters by unfairly allowing them to develop their digital 
audience – a crucial revenue base for subscription television services (European 
Commission 2007). 
In making this judgement, the EC contended that even those measures 
that supported an objective of common interest (like digitalization) must 
be proportional. The Italian explanation that the subsidy could be excused 
under those rules regarding the social character of State Aid was not 
accepted. Further, the utilization of public subsidies not only benefited some 
consumers over others, but aided the incumbent companies and discrimi-
nated against other operators who had to provide their consumers with 
decoding equipment at their own expense. Concurrently, the Commission 
rejected the argument that the aid was only part of delivering services of 
general economic interest and required Mediaset to payback the subsidies it 
had received (Renzi 2010). 
Subsequently, when Mediaset appealed the decision, the Court of Justice 
of the EU backed the EC in 2011 by ruling that the Italian government’s use 
of subsidies infringed the European State Aid rules (case T-177/07). The court 
expressed agreement with the Commission’s assertion that the grant did not 
have the required technology neutrality and that:
On one hand it gave consumers an incentive to move from an analogue 
system to a digital terrestrial system, thus limiting expenses for that 
digital terrestrial television broadcasters, and on the other it had allowed 
these same broadcasters to consolidate their position in the market 
compared to new competitors, in terms of brand image and reinforcing 
the loyalty of their clientele. 
(Court of Justice of the European Union 2011) 
In effect, the Commission’s decision and the court’s backing tipped the 
balance of power in the Italian pay-TV market to Sky Italia, who immediately 
and successfully sought the further removal of a 2003 clause that barred it 
from entering the DTT market.
THE UNITED KINGDOM: COMPETITION, PUBLIC SERVICE 
MONIES AND THE DISTORTION OF MARKETS
In the United Kingdom, the Directorate became involved in a case that 
referred to whether a potential form of compensation top-sliced from 
the PSB licence fee infringed State Aid rulings. In 2007, the then Labour 
government allowed C4 to utilize £14 million of subsidies drawn from 
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the BBC’s licence fee monies for digital switchover. This led to a stand-
off between the Directorate, C4 and the UK government, with the then 
EC Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes (who has since become the 
Information Society and Media Commissioner) claiming the decision 
breached State Aid rules. 
The UK government’s recommendation had been a major victory for 
C4’s Chief Executive Andy Duncan, who had argued that channel could 
face a £150 million per annum short-fall as digital costs would squeeze 
its advertising revenue and had lobbied for financial assistance to bridge 
the gap. Although, the UK government had notified the EC of its plans in 
October 2007, the investigation was triggered by a complaint from a commer-
cial rival said to be ITV. ITV argued that as C4 was entrusted with a public 
service remit but received its revenue from advertising, sponsorship and 
subscription, its access to licence fee subsidy would unfairly distort the British 
television market. Further, the complainant objected to any further financial 
assistance towards C4 on the grounds that it had ample cash reserves to 
meet the costs of digital switchover (European Commission 2008). In the 
light of these accusations, the Commission expressed doubts about whether 
the proposed aid was appropriate as, given the inadequate information 
it had received from the British government, it could not assess whether 
the channel’s net public service costs were proportionate to its obligations. 
Therefore, the EC argued: 
Although switchover may affect C4’s profitability, it will not affect its • 
viability and therefore this did not constitute a valid reason for claiming 
state funding
A decline in profitability would not necessarily affect C4 in its delivery of • 
its public service remit or its current schedule
C4’s future plans including investments in new media services, the launch • 
of non-PSB channels and the development of video-on-demand services 
undermined its case for further financial support
C4’s non-public service commercial activities should not benefit from any • 
form of State Aid, and 
C4’s reserves of £145 million were sufficient to cover its transmission • 
costs (Brown 2008). 
Thus, in providing an interim decision, Kroes wrote to the then British Foreign 
Secretary David Miliband commenting that the UK government’s plans 
breached the EC’s State Aid rules and claimed: ‘The Commission doubts 
whether the notified measure is compatible with the common market’ (2008). 
Conversely, C4 attempted to minimize the impact of the Competition 
Directorate’s ruling by arguing that the digital switchover assistance from 
the BBC should be counted as ‘special funding’ rather than an unacceptable 
form of state subsidy (Brown 2008). In the event, on 26 November 2008, the 
then UK Secretary of State for the Department of Culture, Media and Sport 
(DCMS) Andy Burnham decided to withdraw the £14 million State Aid for 
the C4’s digital transmission costs (Andrew and Mason 2008). Instead, any 
potential shortfalls in C4’s funding arrangements were to be considered under 
OfCom’s analysis of PSB funding entitled Putting Viewers First (2009) and 
within the then Communications Minister Lord Carter’s interim report Digital 
Britain (DCMS/DBERR 2009).
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CONCLUSION: RECENT DEMANDS, THE CURRENT ECONOMIC 
MALAISE AND THE EUROPEAN PROJECT
With regard to the German, Italian and United Kingdom cases, the Commission 
enforced a liberalizing agenda towards its employment of State Aid rules. In each 
case it argued that public subsidies for switchover could only be applied if they 
did not distort the competitive nature of the specific digital marketplaces. The 
application of these State Aid investigations led to a particular set of outcomes 
that related to the nature of the national broadcasting market, the political and 
ideological values that each government employed towards digitization and the 
relationship between PSBs and the respective commercial sectors. 
Consequently, the MABB case was conditioned by the need to affect a 
coordinated response between public and commercial players to ensure a 
smooth and cohesive switchover. Although it was defined by similar ques-
tions of technical standards of interoperability, the Italian case referred more 
specifically to corporate interests that reflected an on-going battle to control 
the pay-television market between Mediaset and News Corporation. Finally, 
the UK case indicated questions that had permeated the British broadcasting 
economy concerning the top-slicing of the licence fee and the specific nature 
of C4 as a PSB, constituted by a public remit and commercial funding. 
Throughout these cases, the Competition Directorate remained commit-
ted to the principles of technological neutrality and interoperability; the open-
ing up of the market to competition to offset the interests of incumbents and 
to its belief that market failures had to be effectively proved to be proportion-
ate to the needs of the efficient supply of new services:
The decisions … show that, even when public intervention is in principle 
justified, – and indeed the Commission is firmly committed to encourag-
ing the transition to digital TV – the granting of Aid should always follow 
a process of clearly identifying the problem to be addressed and of choos-
ing the least distortive means of solving it. Only well-targeted aid is in 
line with the overall objective of ensuring fair competition and promoting 
competitiveness and technological development in Europe. 
(Schoser and Santamato 2006: 27)
However, more recently, it has faced greater pressures to allow for public forms 
of financial intervention in those Member States that require greater rates of 
investment, either due to the demand to bring in new technical standards or 
because of the relatively weak nature of their broadcasting industries. In France, 
the government notified the EC of its plans for a complete switchover to DVB-T2 
by 30 November 2011, and promised that the new standard would incorporate 
‘bonus channels’ for TF1, M6 and Canal Plus to be allocated in exchange for the 
erosion of their market shares since the introduction of DTV. While the DVB-T2 
standard will not be used until 2013, as it requires consumers to upgrade their 
decoders, the bonus channels may face opposition from the EU, which had 
already warned France in November 2010 about the proposal. 
Elsewhere, in some Eastern European states who have joined the EU due 
to the process of Enlargement concerns have been raised about the ability of 
their citizens to afford the purchase of the new hardware required for DTV 
reception. For instance, in 2010 the EC decided that Slovakia’s 11 million 
scheme to support the purchase of decoders for socially vulnerable groups 
did not infringe the State Aid rules. This meant that those members of the 
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Slovakian public who were on a low income, received an old-age pension or 
were in receipt of benefits became entitled to claim a voucher with a maximum 
value of 20 for the purchase of DTV equipment. This measure was especially 
important as Slovakia had planned to switch from analogue to DTV by the 
end of 2012, and without upgraded devices, these citizens would be excluded 
from this information source. Therefore, such a use of funds for switchover 
may affect the competitive structures of national media markets over a long 
period and in unforeseen ways (European Commission 2010a).
Further, because of the general economic malaise that has affected the EU 
since the Banking Crisis of 2008, there has been a demand to accelerate the 
process of digital switchover due to potential dangers that the establishment 
of the new services will be fatally compromised. Such a slowdown could have 
disastrous consequences for the commercial demand to use the digital divi-
dend from the freed up analogue spectrum (EurActive 2010a). In particular, 
the Commission has estimated that the incremental value of the spectrum 
for wireless broadband across the EU stands at a figure of between 150 and 
200 billion. Especially, the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy for new jobs and sustain-
able growth (which has replaced the Lisbon agenda) has placed the availabil-
ity of high-speed Internet to be rolled out from freed up spectrum as being a 
central component in the EU’s Knowledge Economy. Therefore, it contends 
that an appropriate coordination of Member States is required to affect the 
digital dividend so that its potential economic impact would raise an addi-
tional 50 billion from 2010 to 2015. This is particularly attractive to the EC as 
it is cost free to taxpayers and would be available for all Member States as a 
means of raising further revenues (Reding 2009: 4).
Consequently, the Directorate has to remain mindful that any barri-
ers that it may impose over the use of public subsidies, which are deemed 
to violate competition rules, might detrimentally impact on the development 
of digital services. Paradoxically, by pursuing the values of competition, the 
EU could undermine the commercial benefits to be drawn from the digital 
switchover process. Therefore, the application of these measures on a national 
case-by-case basis has led to a wider range of outcomes as the Competition 
Directorate has become less committed to the explicit rules of competition 
and more supportive of national public subsidies. 
This change in attitude focuses attention on several divisions that exist 
in Competition Directorate between its neo-liberal values and the Member 
States’ normative objectives to maximize the potential for the digital market 
along with an effective delivery of services with a pronounced social character. 
Further, all of these cases have indicated that wider tensions exist in the inte-
grationist ‘European Project’ in relation to cultural policies as the inherent: 
Economic and liberalizing concepts designed to ensure the functioning 
of an internal market, as a key pillar of integration established in the 
Treaty, are not always easily aligned to the historical policy framework 
that has evolved in individual member states and they are not in them-
selves sufficient to ensure public interest objectives are achieved in this 
vital sector for European societies and economies […]. The complex-
ities are further increased by the architecture of the EU itself as it is 
composed of policy making processes whose design, all things being 
equal, is inextricably stamped with a trade off between the terms of the 
EC Treaty and national interests. 
(Ward 2008: 2)
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Thus, throughout the process of employing State Aid measures to aid 
analogue switch-off and digital switchover there has been a growing divi-
sion between the principles of supra-nationalism and inter-governmental-
ism (Iosifidis 2011a). On one hand, Member States have been concerned 
that their sovereign powers have been undermined by the EU as the 
Competition Directorate has exercized too much control in determining the 
use of public subsidies. On the other, it has been a concern that the EU’s 
normative liberalizing agenda has conflicted with the needs for coordinated 
forms of switchover to allow for the commercial benefits and demands for 
social cohesion to be realized in relation to digitization (Nordlander and 
Melin 2006: 267). 
Conversely, the Directorate has been concerned with its belief that 
Member States have abused their rights of derogation within the European 
Treaty to expand the digital public service remit in unauthorized ways, such 
as financing commercial digital activities. Moreover, questions of market frag-
mentation continue to be related to the DTV take-up rates and the utiliza-
tion of the digital dividend made available from freed up analogue spectrum 
(Kroes 2010). Therefore, these tensions indicate how the questions of subsidi-
arity and complexities of cultural practices have increasingly come to fore in 
digital switchover process. As reflected in many areas of EU audio-visual poli-
cies, they demonstrate that media and communications reform is as much 
determined by political and social interests as by the technocratic, legalistic 
and economic demands of Competition Policy. 
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